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Total Articles 91 - 99 of 173 | |

Coordination, Differentiation and Fairness in a Population of Cooperating Agents

Author(s):Anne-Ly Do -- Lars Rudolf -- Thilo Gross
Journal: Games
Publisher:
Abstract
| Pages: 30-40
In a recent paper, we analyzed the self-assembly of a complex cooperation network. The network was shown to approach a state where every agent invests the same amount of resources. Nevertheless, highly-connected agents arise that extract extraordinarily high payoffs while contributing comparably little to any of their cooperations. Here, we investigate a variant of the model, in which highly-connected agents have access to additional resources. We study analytically and numerically whether these resources are invested in existing collaborations, leading to a fairer load distribution, or in establishing new collaborations, leading to an even less fair distribution of loads and payoffs.

Games with Synergistic Preferences

Author(s):Julian Jamison
Journal: Games
Publisher:
Abstract
| Pages: 41-55
Players in economic situations often have preferences not only over their own outcome but also over what happens to fellow players, entirely apart from any strategic considerations. While this can be modeled directly by simply writing down final preferences, these are commonly unknown a priori. In many cases it is therefore both helpful and instructive to explicitly model these interactions. This paper presents a simple structure in the context of game theory, building on a model due to Bergstrom, that incorporates these ‘synergisms’ between players. It is powerful enough to cover a wide range of such interactions and model many disparate experimental and empirical results, yet straightforward enough to be used in many applied situations where altruism, or a baser motive, is implied.

Patience or Fairness? Analyzing Social Preferences in Repeated Games

Author(s):John Duffy -- Félix Muñoz-García
Journal: Games
Publisher:
Abstract
| Pages: 56-77
This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both the one-shot and the infinitely repeated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We show that fairness concerns operate as a ”substitute” for time discounting in the infinitely repeated game, as fairness helps sustain cooperation for lower discount factors. In addition, such cooperation can be supported under larger parameter values if players are informed about each others’ social preferences than if they are uninformed. Finally, our results help to identify conditions under which cooperative behavior observed in recent experimental repeated games can be rationalized using time preferences alone (patience) or a combination of time and social preferences (fairness).

What Behaviors are Disapproved? Experimental Evidence from Five Dictator Games

Author(s):Raúl López-Pérez -- Marc Vorsatz
Journal: Games
Publisher:
Abstract
| Pages: 78-96
The literature on social norms has often stressed that social disapproval is crucial to foster compliance with norms and promote fair and cooperative behavior. With this in mind, we explore the disapproval of allocation decisions using experimental data from five dictator games with a feedback stage. Our data suggests that subjects are heterogeneous in their disapproval patterns, distinguishing two main groups: (1) Subjects who only disapprove choices that harm them, and (2) subjects who disapprove socially inefficient choices.

Quantum Type Indeterminacy in Dynamic Decision-Making: Self-Control through Identity Management

Author(s):Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky -- Jerome Busemeyer
Journal: Games
Publisher:
Abstract
| Pages: 97-118
The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In a dynamic decision context, type indeterminacy induces a game with multiple selves associated with a state transition process. We define a Markov perfect equilibrium among the selves with individual identity (preferences) as the state variable. The approach allows to characterize generic personality types and derive some comparative static results.

Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining

Author(s):Stefan Kohler
Journal: Games
Publisher:
Abstract
| Pages: 119-137
Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement occurs even if all experimentally controlled information is common knowledge. This paper rationalizes both regularities coherently by modeling heterogeneous social preferences, either self-interest or envy, of one bargaining party as private information in a three period game of bargaining and preference screening and signaling.

Modeling Inequity Aversion in a Dictator Game with Production

Author(s):Ismael Rodriguez-Lara -- Luis Moreno-Garrido
Journal: Games
Publisher:
Abstract
| Pages: 138-149
We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich et al. [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian principle). In our model, dictators may also account for the way in which the surplus was generated. More precisely, our model incorporates the idea of liberal egalitarian ethics into the analysis, making it possible for dictators to divide the surplus according to the accountability principle, which states that subjects should only be rewarded for factors under their control. This fairness ideal does not hold subjects responsible for factors beyond their control in the production of the surplus, an idea that is absent in the models of inequity aversion cited above (JEL Codes: D3, D6, D63).

Computer Solution to the Game of Pure Strategy

Author(s):Glenn C. Rhoads -- Laurent Bartholdi
Journal: Games
Publisher:
Abstract
| Pages: 150-156
We numerically solve the classical "Game of Pure Strategy" using linear programming. We notice an intricate even-odd behaviour in the results of our computations that seems to encourage odd or maximal bids.

Theory of the Origin, Evolution, and Nature of Life

Author(s):Erik D. Andrulis
Journal: Life
Publisher:
Abstract
| Pages: 1-105
Life is an inordinately complex unsolved puzzle. Despite significant theoretical progress, experimental anomalies, paradoxes, and enigmas have revealed paradigmatic limitations. Thus, the advancement of scientific understanding requires new models that resolve fundamental problems. Here, I present a theoretical framework that economically fits evidence accumulated from examinations of life. This theory is based upon a straightforward and non-mathematical core model and proposes unique yet empirically consistent explanations for major phenomena including, but not limited to, quantum gravity, phase transitions of water, why living systems are predominantly CHNOPS (carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur), homochirality of sugars and amino acids, homeoviscous adaptation, triplet code, and DNA mutations. The theoretical framework unifies the macrocosmic and microcosmic realms, validates predicted laws of nature, and solves the puzzle of the origin and evolution of cellular life in the universe.
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